hieronder een opvallend commentaar (10 mei) van Russische broker Aton (ik krijg de indruk dat het buitenland enthousiaster is over de Russische beurs dan de Russen zelf; overigens kan een overvloed aan buitenlands geld zo'n beurs nog gemakkelijk vooruit blijven duwen):
Russian equity strategy. Russian equities offer unattractive risk-reward trade-off; reduced exposure advised
The 2006 rally, driven by strong commodity prices and money flows, has left Russian equities in what we see as increasingly overvalued territory. Russian oil majors now discount a long-term oil price of more than $55/bbl, Russian steelmakers trade at large premiums to their GEM peers and Russian consumer stocks keep coming to market at ever-more aggressive valuations despite the risks best illustrated by the post-IPO stock performances of Pyaterochka, Trader Media East and Amtel.
Despite the upgrade of our commodity price forecasts, our new targets suggest no fundamental upside for the market (new RTS target is 1,653) in general and many blue-chips in particular under fairly generous long-term assumptions (Brent of $50/bbl, base cost of equity of 11.5%). Our discount rate for Russian equities is unlikely to improve much, considering there is little room for further spread tightening between long-term Russian Eurobonds and US Treasuries. In addition to the lack of fundamental upside, the rising volatility of the market adds to the risks.
We see two reasons why investors may continue buying Russian equities at these levels: expectations of further commodity price advances and abundant liquidity. One reason to buy Russia is the belief commodity prices will continue their ascent; simply remaining at current already high levels may not be enough as this is already discounted by the stock prices. We can’t comment on when (or whether) the current commodity cycle will end, other than to say that the word “cycle” does ultimately imply some mean-reversing process.
Money flows is the strongest and at the same time the weakest reason to buy into Russia at these levels. When matched against the only gradually expanding pool of investable opportunities, the tide of money continuing to flow into Russian equities may continue to outweigh any valuation considerations for some time. However, by accepting available liquidity as the main reason – rather than an important support factor – for rising equity values, an investor effectively makes the “greater fool” theory the only fundamental reason for his/hers actions. The fallacy of this approach appears obvious.
We thus advise investors to adopt a highly defensive approach to investing in Russian equities. We see the current risk-return trade-off as unattractive in absolute terms on a six to 12 month view, with the likely range for Russian equities being 1,500-1,900 on the RTS Index. In relative terms, however, it perhaps still deserves an equal weight, simply because many other EMEA/GEM markets are valued equally – if not more – aggressively.
We see no immediate catalysts for the market to correct and considering there is little difference between being early and being wrong, our overall bearish call is risky. Still, we do believe that in the next six to 12 months, fundamentals will return as the main determinant of Russian equity values, which we see as high at the moment.
Among blue chips our key holdings would be Lukoil, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel and Vimpelcom; we would be underweight SurgutNG, SBER, MBT, RTKM and the steels. We still like a number of independent Russia/FSU energy and mining companies (Sibir, Arawak, Dragon, Imperial, Highland Gold, European Minerals). We also remain fans of the power sector as the restructuring continues; we like networks and distribution over generation. UES (Under Review) remains a good sector proxy.